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Disability Harassment: How Far Should the ADA Follow
in the Footsteps of Title VII?
Leah C. Myers

I. INTRODUCTION
Congress’s statement of findings and purposes for the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) estimated that 43 million
Americans suffer from one or more physical or mental disabilities.1 That
figure has risen to 52.6 million Americans in 1997, or 19.7% of the U.S.
population, according to the Census Bureau.2 Congress also found that
throughout history and in present times, people with disabilities have
been isolated, segregated, and discriminated against in fundamental areas
of life such as employment, housing, and education.3 As a result,
Congress enacted the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities.”4
One of these areas of life that Congress chose to focus on was
employment, as seen in the fact that an entire title of the ADA, Title I, is
devoted to this topic. Congressional hearings referenced data that twothirds of Americans with disabilities between the ages of 16 and 64 are
unemployed despite the fact that two-thirds of these unemployed,
working-age people with disabilities would like to have a job.5
In the wake of the enactment of the ADA in 1990, the federal courts
have been working to clarify the available claims and mode of
enforcement of the Act. One particular claim, disability harassment, the
focus of this article, has been constantly in flux. The availability of a
sexual6 harassment claim for a hostile work environment under Title VII
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2001).
2. JACK MCNEIL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 1997 (Feb.
2001), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disable/sipp/disable97.html.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)-(3) (2001).
4. See id., § 12101(b)(1).
5. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 32 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314.
6. Preceding the development of sexual harassment claims for hostile work environment
were hostile environment claims given other protected characteristics. See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC,
454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972) (race); Compston v. Borden,
Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 161 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (religion). Sexual harassment will be the claim of
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of the Civil Rights Act of 19647 has been evolving since 1986.8 While
several district courts have definitively held that a comparable disability
harassment claim exists under the ADA,9 it was not until 2001 that two
federal circuit courts of appeals delivered such a holding.10 Until these
two perhaps critical holdings, the circuit courts of appeals had generally
assumed without deciding that a disability harassment claim existed
under the ADA.11 These courts then denied every claim case-by-case as
having insufficient evidence to succeed on such a claim, thus allowing
avoidance of the question of the existence of a disability harassment
claim.12 Perhaps these two Courts of appeal decisions signal the start of a
trend under which the federal courts will accept disability harassment
claims more definitively.
While these two cases may signal growing recognition of disability
harassment claims, questions remain about whether it is appropriate to
utilize harassment analysis from Title VII precedent in ADA claims.13 In
certain instances, including cases of disparate treatment discrimination
and retaliation, courts have applied Title VII analysis to ADA cases.14
However, important distinctions between the two statutes indicate that
such borrowing of analysis is not always appropriate.15

harassment under Title VII used in this note for comparison to disability harassment because most
Title VII harassment cases involve discrimination based on sex. Lisa Eichhorn, Hostile Environment
Actions, Title VII, and the ADA: the Limits of the Copy-and-Paste Function, 77 WASH. L. REV. 575,
580 (July 2002).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq (2001).
8. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
9. See, e.g., Lanni v. State, 177 F.R.D. 295, 304 (D. N.J. 1998); Haysman v. Food Lion,
Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1106-07 (S.D. Ga. 1995); Davis v. York Int’l Inc., No. CIV.A. HAR 923545, 1993 WL 524761, at *9-10 (D. Md. 1993).
10. Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 232 (5th Cir. 2001); Fox v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2001).
11. See, e.g., Vollmert v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., 197 F.3d 293, 297 (7th Cir. 1999); Walton v.
Mental Health Ass’n of S.E. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 666-67 (3d Cir. 1999); Wallin v. Minn. Dep’t of
Corr., 153 F.3d 681, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1998); McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp., 131 F.3d
558, 563 (5th Cir. 1998).
12. See supra note 11.
13. See, e.g., Eichhorn, supra note 6, at 578-80 (asserting that Title VII framework should
not be applied to hostile work environment claims under the ADA because each statute employs
very different visions of equality and discrimination); Christine Neagle, An Analysis of the
Applicability of Hostile Work Environment Liability to the ADA, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 715, 728
(2001) (describing argument that in order to effectuate the goals of the ADA, a disability harassment
claim must be recognized); Frank S. Ravitch, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation: the Availability
and Structure of a Cause of Action for Workplace Harassment Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1522 (1994) (encouraging a modified Title VII analysis
of disability harassment claims under the ADA, incorporating the concept of reasonable
accommodation and its defenses).
14. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
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This article discusses whether courts should recognize a disability
harassment claim under Title I of the ADA, and if so, whether courts
should adopt the same analysis as that which is applied to harassment
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Part II provides
history for this topic by investigating whether these two statutes have
analogous visions of employment discrimination as seen through
statutory text and legislative history. Part II also outlines the types of
employment discrimination claims available under both Title VII and the
ADA and discusses which ADA claims are evaluated through adopting
Title VII analysis. Part III focuses on the topic of disability harassment
by first summarizing how the courts have addressed disability
harassment claims so far. Part III then explores whether Title VII
harassment analysis, employed primarily in sexual harassment cases,
coincides with the purposes and text of the ADA. Next, Part IV proposes
a resolution to this issue by suggesting a reasonable victim analysis for
disability harassment claims after discussing several standards that have
been debated in the harassment context. Finally, Part V provides some
further support for allowing disability harassment claims under the ADA.
II. HISTORY
According to the legislative history for Title VII, the purpose of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to establish “a congressionally declared
national policy of nondiscrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin in matters of promotion and employment.”16 Similarly,
the text of the statute specifies one purpose of the ADA is, “to provide a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”17
A.

Employment Discrimination Under Title VII and the ADA:
Statutory Language

Although Title VII was passed in 1964, legislative attempts to
address employment discrimination based on characteristics including
the five covered in that Act had been developing in decades prior to
1964. Perhaps the earliest regulation was in the Civil Service Act of
1883, which included a ban on religious discrimination in federal
employment.18 Further regulation in this area developed, including
provisions in New Deal legislation, executive orders addressing
16. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 3119 (1968) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2001).
18. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, at 1.
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government contracts, and state fair employment practice laws.19 This
history reveals a national awareness of the need to develop a policy
addressing employment discrimination on the basis of minority and
gender status, eventually culminating in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
its later amendments.
Title I of the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have
shared visions of civil rights protection as shown by the statutory text
and legislative history of the ADA. For example, the ADA explicitly
states that specific enforcement provisions under Title VII are to serve
also as the powers, remedies and procedures of Title I.20 In addition, the
ADA incorporates by reference the definitions of “employee” and
“employer” from Title VII.21 More broadly, the House Judiciary
Committee stated: “The Americans With Disabilities Act completes the
circle begun in 1973 with respect to persons with disabilities by
extending to them the same civil rights protections provided to women
and minorities beginning in 1964.”22
Nonetheless, given key differences between the two statutes, the
whole of Title VII analysis has not been applied to ADA claims. First
and most importantly, the prohibition of discrimination under the ADA
includes an affirmative duty to reasonably accommodate, limited by an
affirmative defense where such accommodation would cause an undue
hardship on the employer.23 The term “reasonable accommodation” can
also be found in Title VII, in a much different context.24 Title VII
incorporates reasonable accommodation within its definition of one
protected class, religion: “The term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
19. Id. at 1-6.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2001).
21. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 76 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 359.
22. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 26 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 449. In
fact, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has stated that, “[T]he Civil Rights Act of 1964 served as
a model for future civil rights laws, including the ADA.” U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HELPING
EMPLOYERS COMPLY WITH THE ADA, 15 (1998) [hereinafter HELPING EMPLOYERS].
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2001). This provision provides:
(5)(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or
employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity; or
(5)(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of
such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental
impairments of the employee or applicant.
Id.
24. See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 6-7 (1996).
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employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”25
In order to avoid a conflict with the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, however, the Supreme Court limited this duty to reasonably
accommodate religion under Title VII by recognizing that any cost
greater than a de minimis cost constitutes an undue hardship negating the
duty.26 In contrast, reasonable accommodation under the ADA can have
a much greater cost to employers, although the precise breadth of the
duty has yet to be clearly defined by the courts.27
Second, the provisions of the ADA only can be invoked by a
“qualified individual with a disability,” which is defined as, “an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires.”28 “Disability” is defined
as: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”29 The
U.S. Supreme Court recently clarified the meaning of part A of this
definition of disability under the ADA. The Court held: “to be
substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must have
an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from
doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily
lives. The impairment’s impact must also be permanent or long term.”30
The evaluation of disability is frequently done on a case-by-case basis
because symptoms of some disabilities and illnesses can vary widely.31
In contrast, the discrimination provision of Title VII applies to “any
individual” who is discriminated against “because of such individual’s

25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2001).
26. Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977); see also Karlan & Rutherglen,
supra note 24, at 7.
27. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 24, at 8. The ADA’s definition of reasonable
accommodation indicates its potentially extensive scope:
The term “reasonable accommodation” may include—
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant
position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or
modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2001).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2001).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2001).
30. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002).
31. Id.at 199.
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race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”32 While evidence and
analysis is needed to establish disability for ADA claims, whether an
individual falls under one of the five protected classes under Title VII is
usually self-evident.
There also are important similarities, particularly in the provisions
relevant to claims of harassment, between the two statutes. According to
the EEOC,33 Title VII § 703(a)(1) expressly proscribes sexual
harassment, stating: “It shall be unlawful employment practice for an
employer – to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”34
The prohibition of discrimination in Title I of the ADA utilizes
similar language: “No covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”35
Given these important textual similarities between Title VII and the
ADA, it is useful to evaluate the way these statutes are applied by the
courts.
B.

Types of Employment Discrimination Claims Available Under Title
VII

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides statutory authority
to support several types of employment discrimination claims. One claim
supported by Title VII is that of invidious discrimination because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin—the five characteristics covered
by the Act—as shown through direct evidence.36 Direct evidence can be
particularly effective in convincing the fact finder that discrimination
occurred; this method of proof is not frequently used, however, because
employee-plaintiffs rarely have such evidence to present.37

32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2001).
33. Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, Notice 915-050 (Equal Emp.
Opp. Comm’n Mar. 19, 1990), available at U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N, SEX DISCRIMINATION
ISSUES: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED BY TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1964, AS AMENDED AND THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963, C-1 (1996) [hereinafter SEX
DISCRIMINATION].
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2001).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2001).
36. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 670 (1989).
37. Id.
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In 1971, the United States Supreme Court confirmed the availability
of a second type of claim under Title VII, a claim of discrimination
shown through disparate impact.38 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,39 a
group of “incumbent Negro employees” working at a power-generating
facility challenged the validity of the employer requiring a high-school
degree or passage of a standardized general intelligence test in order to
receive employment.40 Under a disparate impact theory recognized in
Griggs, an employer is proscribed from implementing practices that are
facially fair but discriminatory in effect, regardless of the employer’s
intent, unless the practice is sufficiently related to business necessity.41
Only two years later, the Supreme Court explained a third claim
under Title VII, proof of discrimination through individual disparate
treatment.42 In McDonnell Douglas v. Green,43 the respondent, an
African-American civil-rights activist, following his participation in a
“lock-in” protest, claimed that his discharge was racially motivated
rather than a part of a general work force reduction as claimed by the
employer.44 The Court developed a burden-shifting analysis for use in
analyzing disparate treatment claims: first, the complainant faces a
burden of proving a prima facie case of racial discrimination;45 if met,
the burden then shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory justification for the challenged action; if met, the
burden finally shifts back to the complainant to demonstrate that the
employer’s justification is only a pretext for unlawful discrimination.46

38. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-33 (1971).
39. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
40. Id. at 425-26.
41. Id. at 431-32. The statutory authority for disparate impact claims under Title VII is found
in Section 703(a)(2) which prohibits employers from: “limit[ing], segregat[ing], or classify[ing]
[their] employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual or employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)
(2001).
42. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973).
43. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
44. Id. at 794-95.
45. The Court outlined four steps to establishing a prima facie case of discrimination
appropriate under the facts:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.
Id. at 802. The Court also noted that differing factual situations may demand alterations to this test.
Id. at 802 n.13.
46. Id. at 802-04. The statutory authority for disparate treatment claims under Title VII is
found in Section 703(a)(1) which makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
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Around the time of these landmark Supreme Court cases, lower
federal courts were laying the foundation for a fourth type of claim under
Title VII, harassment.47 While these examples of early cases concerned
race and religion, there since has been much greater development of
harassment claims through claims of sexual harassment. There are two
recognized types of harassment prohibited under Title VII: quid pro quo
harassment and hostile work environment harassment.48 Quid pro quo
harassment exists when “submission to or rejection of such conduct by
an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual.”49 In contrast, hostile work environment harassment is
present when “unwelcome sexual conduct . . . ‘unreasonably interfer[es]
with an individual’s job performance’ or creates an ‘intimidating, hostile,
or offensive working environment’ . . . even if it leads to no tangible or
economic job consequences.”50 The Supreme Court in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson51 confirmed that both types of harassment are prohibited
by Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII.52
Finally, Title VII also supports retaliation claims.53 In order to
establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must establish
three elements: first, that she was participating in a “statutorily protected
activity;” second, that the employer made an adverse employment
decision against her; and finally, that the first two elements are causally
linked.54
C. Types of Employment Discrimination Claims Available Under the
ADA
Several of these Title VII concepts are present in ADA analysis.
Although a complex statute, Title I of the ADA can be best summarized

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2001).
47. See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972) (holding that a hostile work environment because of race violated Section 703(a)(1) of Title
VII); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 161 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (finding that a hostile work
environment because of religion violated Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII).
48. SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 33, at C-2.
49. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(2) (2002)). For case law examples of quid pro quo
harassment, see, e.g., Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 212 (9th Cir. 1979) (alleging plaintiff
was terminated when she refused to accept her supervisor’s sexual advances); Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983, 984-85 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (alleging plaintiff’s job was eradicated after she refused to
cooperate with her supervisor’s sexual advances).
50. SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 30, at C-2 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (2002)).
51. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
52. Id. at 65-66. For the text of Section 703(a)(1), see supra note 46.
53. See, e.g., Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
54. Id.
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as prohibiting employment discrimination against people with disabilities
and affirmatively requiring employers to provide disabled people with
reasonable accommodations when providing such accommodation would
not pose an undue hardship on the business.55 Following a general
proscription of discrimination, Title I lists seven examples of actions that
are included in the definition of “discrimination,” none of which
explicitly mention harassment.56 Therefore, there is no explicit textual
reference to disability harassment as a prohibited form of discrimination.

55. DAVID WOLOWITZ & MICHAEL O’CONNOR,
FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, 6-1-1, 6-1-3 (2000).

THE GUIDEBOOK OF LAWS AND PROGRAMS

56. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) – (7) (2001). These provisions in full indicate that
“discrimination” includes:
(1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that
adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of the
disability of such applicant or employee;
(2) participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that has the effect of
subjecting a covered entity’s qualified applicant or employee with a disability to the
discrimination prohibited by this subchapter (such relationship includes a relationship
with an employment or referral agency, labor union, an organization providing fringe
benefits to an employee of the covered entity, or an organization providing training and
apprenticeship programs);
(3) utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration –
that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability; or
that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to common administrative
control;
(4) excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual
because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is
known to have a relationship or association;
(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee,
unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of
such covered entity to made reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental
impairments of the employee or applicant;
(6) using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen
out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with
disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered
entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is consistent with
business necessity; and
(7) failing to select and administer tests concerning employment in the most effective
manner to ensure that, when such test is administered to a job applicant or employee who
has a disability that impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills, such test results
accurately reflect the skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor of such applicant or
employee that such test purports to measure, rather than reflecting the impaired sensory,
manual, or speaking skills of such employee or applicant (except where such skills are
the factors that the test purports to measure).
Id.
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The EEOC, in interpreting the ADA and providing guidance on ADA
enforcement, has expanded this list slightly.57
However, this statutory subsection does not purport to present an allinclusive list of forms of discrimination prohibited by Title I of the ADA.
In fact, through September 1998, the EEOC has compiled data on suits
that reveal that 47 different types of issues have been raised under the
ADA.58 Among these 47 issues, harassment due to disability was the
fourth most common claim raised, totaling 6.8% of ADA charges.59
Court analysis of claims under the ADA has often followed the Title
VII model. In cases brought under the ADA, courts have described the
two main routes of proof of discrimination as being through direct
evidence and through indirect evidence. These court rulings mirror the
Title VII dichotomy between direct evidence and disparate
impact/disparate treatment.60 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
that the ADA, like Title VII, explicitly “forbids ‘utilizing standards,
criteria, or methods of administration’ that disparately impact the
disabled, without regard to whether such conduct has a rational basis.”61
The claim for retaliation under the ADA also mirrors Title VII
precedent.62 Nevertheless, by far the greatest borrowing of the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting standard for disparate treatment
claims has occurred in ADA analysis.

57. See U.S. EEOC, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
PROHIBITED BY THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, at I-4 (1998) [hereinafter
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION]. In addition to the seven examples provided in the text of the ADA,
the EEOC also lists retaliation: “Discriminating against an individual because s/he has opposed an
employment practice of the employer or filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing to enforce provisions of the Act.” Id. Finally, and most notably
for the purposes of this Note: “EEOC also considers ‘disability harassment’ a form of discrimination
under the ADA.” HELPING EMPLOYERS, supra note 22, at 79.
58. HELPING EMPLOYERS, supra note 22, at 284-85. These issues include, in descending
order of frequency: discharge, reasonable accommodation, terms and conditions, harassment, hiring,
other, discipline, layoff, promotion, wages, demotion, constructive discharge, reinstatement,
suspension, benefits, intimidation, sexual harassment, assignment, recall, benefits—insurance,
training, union representation, prohibited medical inquiry/exam, retirement involuntary, job
classification, references unfavorable, exclusion, benefits—retirement/pension, referral, seniority,
qualifications, maternity, testing, tenure, record keeping violation, severance pay denied, filing EEO
forms, apprenticeship, advertising, early retirement incentive, segregated facilities, posting notice,
waiver of ADEA suit rights, paternity, other language/accent issue, segregated locals, English
language only rule. Id.
59. Id. at 284.
60. See, e.g., Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir.
2002).
61. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372 (2001) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(3)(A) (2001)) (emphasis added).
62. See, e.g., Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1997).
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D. ADA Employment Discrimination Claims Borrowing Title VII
Burden-Shifting Analysis
Almost all of the federal circuit courts of appeals have considered
whether to apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis,63 first
developed for Title VII claims, to various ADA claims.64 Generally
speaking, nine circuits have applied that burden-shifting analysis to
disability discrimination claims based on disparate treatment, through
indirect evidence.65 In addition, courts have utilized past analysis from
Title VII retaliation claims in similar claims arising under the ADA.66
Courts have, however, recognized that important differences between
Title VII and the ADA render the application of Title VII analysis to
ADA claims inappropriate in certain circumstances.67 These differences
justify the assertion by courts that Title VII analysis cannot be
incorporated wholesale in ADA cases.68 Where the employer has acted,
and claims that this action was unrelated to the employee’s disability,
application of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis is more
appropriate.69 Title VII is based on the premise that, in most
circumstances, it is impermissible to make employment decisions based
on its covered factors: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.70 In

63. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Soileau, 105 F.3d at 16..
65. See Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2001); Parry v.
Mohawk Motors of Mich., Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 310 (6th Cir. 2000); Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d
1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2000); Butler v. City of Prairie Village, Kan., 172 F.3d 736, 747 (10th Cir.
1999); Price v. S-B Power Tool, 75 F.3d 362, 364-65 (8th Cir. 1996); Daigle v. Liberty Life Ins. Co.,
70 F.3d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1995); Newman v. GHS Osteopathic, Inc., Parkview Hosp. Div., 60 F.3d
153, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1995); Ennis v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 57-58 (4th
Cir. 1995); DeLuca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 1995).
66. See, e.g., Soileau, 105 F.3d at 16.
67. See, e.g., Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[T]here are
significant differences between certain types of disability-based discrimination and other categories
of employment discrimination, and thus the McDonnell Douglas framework should not be
reflexively applied to ADA cases, but should be preceded by a careful consideration of its
appropriateness to the particular disability discrimination claim. . . .”). For an in-depth discussion of
this issue, see Kevin W. Williams, Note, The Reasonable Accommodation Difference: the Effect of
Applying the Burden Shifting Frameworks Developed Under Title VII in Disparate Treatment Cases
to Claims Brought Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 98 (1997).
68. See, e.g., Ennis, 53 F.3d at 59 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Although we accept the McDonnell
Douglas framework as a useful tool, it should not be applied in a ‘rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic’
manner. The paradigm is merely a means to fine-tune the presentation of proof and, more
importantly, to sharpen the focus on the ultimate question—whether the plaintiff successfully
demonstrated that the defendant intentionally discriminated against her.” (citation omitted)).
69. See Aka, 116 F.3d at 886; Williams, supra note 67, at 113-14, 129-30.
70. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, at 3119-20 (“The avowed purpose of title VII of
the bill is to eliminate . . . discrimination in employment on account of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin . . . . In contrast, it would not constitute an unlawful employment practice to hire a
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contrast, an important provision of the ADA requires employers to
consider disability in the affirmative requirement of reasonable
accommodation.71 Given this important distinction, most courts facing
the issue have refused to apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
analysis to a claim regarding an employer’s failure to reasonably
accommodate under the ADA.72
This brief summary and comparison of the ADA and Title VII
reveals many important parallels and differences between the language,
purpose, and intent of the two statutes. Therefore, greater analysis of
harassment specifically is needed to explore the suitability of a potential
disability harassment claim.
III. ANALYSIS
The fact that all ADA claims have not been analyzed under Title VII
precedent should not be determinative of the appropriateness of a
disability harassment claim under the ADA. There are, however,
important differences between the provisions of the ADA and of Title
VII and important differences between the nature of each statute’s
protected class(es). These differences should be explored in order to
determine whether the framework used by courts in evaluating sexual
harassment claims under Title VII can be used in the same or a modified
form when analyzing disability harassment claims. But even before the
legal tests are explored, these two statutes must be examined to see
whether the intent and purpose behind each statute is sufficiently similar
to justify the transfer of Title VII sexual harassment precedent to
disability harassment claims.
A. Overview of Court of Appeals & District Court Treatment of
Disability Harassment Claims
A useful starting point in evaluating these two statutes is to examine
how courts have dealt with disability harassment claims so far. There has
been a split in the way the lower courts have addressed disability
harassment claims under the ADA. There are four general categories into
which the federal courts fall: 1) expressly holding that a claim for

person of a particular religion, sex, or national origin in those limited circumstances where religion,
sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification.”) (emphasis added).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2000). For full text of this provision, see supra note 56.
72. See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 264 (1st Cir. 1999);
Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1283 (7th Cir. 1996); but see Benson v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying a modified burden-shifting
analysis to a failure to reasonably accommodate claim).
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disability harassment exists under the ADA;73 2) assuming without
deciding that such a claim exists, then denying the claim for insufficient
evidence;74 3) considering such a claim without expressly discussing
whether such a claim exists, then denying the claim for insufficient
evidence;75 and 4) as yet having no published opinions on point.76 Each
category will be considered briefly in turn below.
1. Courts expressly holding that a claim for disability harassment exists
under the ADA
Very recently and very notably, two federal circuit courts expressly
held that disability harassment claims are cognizable under the ADA.77
Prior to these two cases, the federal circuit courts of appeals had avoided
the issue.78 In contrast, the federal district courts, from a variety of
jurisdictions, have expressly held that disability harassment claims are
cognizable under the ADA on numerous occasions.79 Both federal circuit
courts of appeals cases include reasoned analysis to justify their
holdings.
In Fox v. General. Motors Corp.,80 plaintiff Robert Fox was
restricted by his doctor to “light-duty work” because of his non-work
related back injury for his job at a General Motors plant.81 Fox
encountered resentment and complaints about his requests for
accommodations in compliance with his doctor’s recommendation.82 For
example, although Fox could complete several jobs within his
department, his general foreman kept assigning him to jobs he could not
do. The foreman also made derogatory comments about Fox.83

73. See infra notes 77-95 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
77. Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 232 (5th Cir. 2001); Fox v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2001).
78. See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Ballard v. Healthsouth Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 529, 536 (N.D. Tex. 2001)
(following Flowers in expressly recognizing disability harassment as a cognizable claim); Vendetta
v. Bell Atl. Corp., No. CIV.A.97-4838, 1998 WL 575111, at *9 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Hendler v.
Intelecom U.S.A., Inc., 963 F. Supp. 200, 208 (E.D. N.Y. 1997); Chua v. St. Paul Fed. Bank for
Sav., 1996 WL 312079, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092,
1108-09 (S.D. Ga. 1995); Mannell v. Am. Tobacco Co., 871 F. Supp. 854, 860 (E.D. Va. 1994);
Davis v. York Int’l Inc., 1993 WL 524761, at *9 (D. Md. 1993).
80. 247 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001).
81. Id. at 172-73.
82. Id. at 173.
83. Id. For example, when Fox told his supervisor he could not do a certain task because of
his medical limitations, his supervisor responded, “I don’t need any of you handicapped M——-F—
——’s. As far as I am concerned, you can go the H—- home.” Id. According to Fox, similar verbal

MYERS - MACRO FINAL

278

4/30/2003 5:10 PM

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume XVII

The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by responding to defendant’s
contention that disability harassment is not a cognizable claim under the
ADA.84 The court first noted that the Supreme Court recognized a hostile
work environment claim under the proscription of discrimination in Title
VII based on very similar language to the “terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment” language of the ADA.85 Because this
language had been interpreted by the Supreme Court in this way under
Title VII prior to the enactment of the ADA, the court assumed that the
use of almost identical language in the ADA demonstrated a
congressional intent to include a parallel harassment claim under the
ADA.86 Finally, the court noted the similarity in purpose between the two
statutes and the examples of courts borrowing Title VII analysis with
reference to ADA claims as further support for the holding.87
In Flowers v. South. Regional Physician Services. Inc.,88 the Fifth
Circuit similarly held that a disability harassment claim is actionable
under the ADA almost contemporaneously with the Fox case.89 In
Flowers, plaintiff Sandra Flowers worked as a medical assistant.90 In
March 1995, Flowers’ supervisor learned that she was HIV positive; she
was terminated in November 1995.91 In a charge filed with the EEOC,
Flowers alleged that she was terminated because of her disability and
that she was subject to harassing actions meant to either encourage her to
resign or to cast her “in a false light” for the purpose of terminating her.92
In addressing the existence of a disability harassment claim under the
ADA, the Fifth Circuit first acknowledged that other circuits have denied
such claims, usually after assuming without deciding that such a claim is
actionable.93 The Flowers court, like the Fox court, noted that the

harassment occurred on a “constant” basis, from several co-workers as well as his supervisor. Id. at
174.
84. Id. at 175-76.
85. Id. at 175.
86. Id. For examples of this interpretation by the Supreme Court, see Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); and Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-66 (1986). The ADA
proscribes discrimination as to “terms, conditions, and privileges of employment,” 42 U.S.C. §
12112(a) (2001) (emphasis added), while the Title VII prohibits discrimination as to “terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2001) (emphasis added).
87. Fox, 247 F.3d at 176; see also supra notes 16-17, 63-64 and accompanying text.
88. 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001).
89. Flowers,247 F.3d 229, 232 (5th Cir. 2001). The Flowers case was decided March 30,
2001. Id. at 229. The Fox case was decided April 13, 2001. Fox, 247 F.3d at 169.
90. Flowers, 247 F.3d at 231.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 231-32.
93. Id. at 232-33. The court characterizes the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Keever v.
Middletown, 145 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1998), as “implicitly” recognizing such a claim “albeit with no
analysis.” Flowers, 247 F.3d at 233 n.2; see also infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
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virtually identical statutory provision concerning terms, conditions and
privileges justified a consistent application of these provisions through
recognizing a disability harassment claim under basic principles of
statutory interpretation.94 In addition, the court pointed to holdings of
federal district courts recognizing the claim as well as the similarity in
purpose and remedial framework between the ADA and Title VII as
further support that disability harassment is a cognizable claim under the
ADA.95
2. Courts assuming without deciding that a disability harassment claim
exists, then denying the claim for insufficient evidence
Several circuit courts of appeals have taken this second approach to
disability harassment claims, including the Third, Seventh, Tenth, and
perhaps Eighth Circuits.96 For example, in Walton v. Mental Health
Ass’n of South East Pennsylvania.,97 plaintiff Sandra Walton worked for
defendant, an advocacy organization for people with mental illnesses;
Walton herself suffered from the disability of depression.98 Walton
alleged that certain comments and actions by her supervisor constituted
harassment, including, for example, repeated phone calls while Walton
was hospitalized inquiring when she would return to work.99
In analyzing whether to recognize a disability harassment claim
under the ADA, the Third Circuit first noted that the ADA contains
language almost identical to that which the Supreme Court has held
supports a hostile work environment claim under Title VII.100 The court
went on to describe the standard that would apply to such a claim,
mirroring the Title VII standard.101 Applying this standard, the court
deduced that a reasonable jury could not find that harassment had taken

94. Flowers, 247 F.3d at 233; see also supra note 83.
95. Flowers, 247 F.3d at 234-35; see also supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1253 (10th Cir. 2001); Vollmert v. Wis.
Dep’t of Transp., 197 F.3d 293, 297 (7th Cir. 1999); Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of S.E. Pa., 168
F.3d 661, 666-67 (3d Cir. 1999); Moritz v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 147 F.3d 784, 788 (8th Cir. 1998).
The position of the Eighth Circuit is unclear, or perhaps inconsistent, as noted by other courts. The
Seventh Circuit notes that the 1998 Moritz case, cited above, assumes without deciding that a
disability harassment claim exists, and then denies the claim on the merits. Silk v. City of Chicago,
194 F.3d 788, 803-804 & n.15 (7th Cir. 1999). However, the Silk court also points to the Eighth
Circuit’s 1998 Cody case, see infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text, as an example of a case in
which a court recognizes a disability harassment claim, “without discussion,” before affirming
summary judgment for the employer. Silk, 194 F.3d at 803 & n.14.
97. 168 F.3d 661 (3d Cir. 1999).
98. Id. at 664.
99. Id. at 667 & n.4.
100. Id. at 666; see also supra note 83 and accompanying text.
101. Walton, 168 F.3d at 667.
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place. Therefore, the court chose to assume without deciding that such a
claim could exist.102 This case is representative of other federal circuit
courts of appeals cases within this category.103
3. Courts considering a disability harassment claim without expressly
deciding whether such a claim exists, then denying the claim for
insufficient evidence
Two circuits, the Sixth and perhaps the Eighth, fall into this third
category of approaches to disability harassment claims.104 In Keever v.
City of Middletown,105 the Sixth Circuit, within a single paragraph,
mentions the alleged disability harassment claim denied below upon
motion for summary judgment, and affirms this denial with no discussion
of whether such a claim is cognizable under the ADA.106
While the Eighth Circuit analyzed the disability harassment claim in
more depth than the Sixth Circuit did in the Keever case, the Eighth
Circuit similarly skipped the step of justifying the existence of such a
claim in Cody v. Cigna Healthcare of St. Louis, Inc.107 The court simply
stated: “The ADA prohibits employment discrimination against a
qualified individual because of a disability. (citation omitted) In all
constructive discharge and harassment cases under the ADA . . . the
plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case of discrimination or face
dismissal of her claim.”108
Perhaps it is inaccurate to conclude that these two decisions
constitute an additional category of analysis of disability harassment
claims independent of the second category, assuming such a claim exists
without so deciding because of insufficient evidence to succeed on the
claim. After all, three years after the Cody and Keever cases, the Tenth
Circuit contended: “No federal appellate court has yet directly ruled on
whether a hostile work environment claim can even be brought under the
ADA.”109 However these two cases should be interpreted, they certainly
102. Id. at 666-67.
103. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
104. See supra and infra notes 96, 105-10 and accompanying text.
105. 145 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1998).
106. Id. at 813. The analysis of the disability harassment claim, in its entirety: “Keever has
failed to establish any facts concerning whether the harassment he claims took place was severe
enough to create an objectively hostile work environment. Conversations between an employee and
his superiors about his performance does not constitute harassment simply because they cause the
employee distress.” Id. For another court’s interpretation of this case, see infra note 106 and
accompanying text.
107. Cody v. Cigna Healthcare of St. Louis, Inc., 139 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1998).
108. Id. (citations omitted).
109. Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1252 (10th Cir. 2001). This statement is not
inconsistent with the Fox and Flowers cases, see supra notes 77-92 and accompanying text, because
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fall short of explicit recognition of a disability harassment claim under
the ADA comparable to that in the Fox and Flowers cases,110 and thus
are less significant in the determination of whether such a claim should
in fact exist.
4. Courts having no published opinions about disability harassment
Five circuits, including the First, Second, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits, fall into this final category.111 While such a category at first
glance seems uninformative, there may be more to the story than the
simple fact that such claims have not been raised yet in these
jurisdictions.112
One reason for the lack of precedent in these jurisdictions is that
many disability harassment claims have been dismissed for procedural
reasons,113 and so presumably are not published because they would add
little to the body of law. But even more interesting is a second reason:
cases addressing the cognizance of a disability harassment claim may not
be selected for publication so that the decisions lack binding force and
need not be reconciled with other unpublished cases.114 Of course it is
impossible to discern conclusively the motivations behind these
publication decisions.
Nonetheless, an interesting characteristic should be noted among
unpublished decisions addressing disability harassment claims under the
ADA in the Ninth Circuit. For example, two cases in this jurisdiction fall
into the second category115 described above in that they assume without
deciding that such a claim exists and then deny the claim given
insufficient evidence.116 Another case, in contrast, would belong in the
third category117 described above because it never justifies or explains
the existence of a disability harassment claim under the ADA but then

the Steele case came down in February 2001, while the Fox and Flowers cases came down in April
and March 2001, respectively.
110. See supra notes 77, 80-95 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
112. There is likely more to the story given the frequency with which disability harassment
claims are raised. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Giardina v. Healthnow New York, Inc., No. 00-7196, 2000 WL 1370316, at *1
(2d Cir.) (unpublished decision) (affirming that the disability harassment claim would not be
considered on appeal because it was time-barred).
114. See, e.g., FED. CL. CT. R. 52(a); D.C. CIR. R. 28(c); 7TH CIR. R. 53(b)(2)(iv); 9TH CIR. R.
36-3(a); 10TH CIR. R. 36.3(A); 11TH CIR. R. 36-2.
115. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
116. Vawser v. Fred Meyer, Inc., No. 00-36081, 2001 WL 1174084, at *2 (9th Cir.)
(unpublished decision); Baumgart v. Washington, No. 98-35172, 1999 WL 535795, at *1 (9th Cir.)
(unpublished decision).
117. See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
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denies the claim due to inadequate evidence.118 This apparent
inconsistency, coupled with the failure to publish any of these decisions,
perhaps reflects the inability or the unwillingness of the Ninth Circuit to
take a definitive stance on the issue of the cognizance of a disability
harassment claim under the ADA.119 The example of the Ninth Circuit is
a microcosm of the hesitance and inconsistency among all but two of the
federal circuit courts of appeals as to whether a disability harassment
claim exists under the ADA.120
B. Is a Disability Harassment Claim Appropriate: ADA Language and
Background
Several factors indicate the appropriateness of interpreting that a
harassment claim exists under the ADA. In 1993, the EEOC attempted to
facilitate a unified policy governing harassment based on “race, color,
religion, gender (excluding harassment that is sexual in nature, which is
covered by the Commission’s Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Sex), national origin, age, or disability” through proposed rules.121 These

118. Williams v. Boeing Co. No. 97-36098, 1999 WL 50882, at *2 (9th Cir.) (unpublished
decision).
119. Such hesitance or indecisiveness contrasts sharply with the Fourth Circuit’s clear and
definitive stance: “[W]e have little difficulty in concluding that the ADA, like Title VII, creates a
cause of action for hostile work environment harassment.” Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169,
176 (4th Cir. 2001).
120. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits explicitly recognized a disability harassment claim under
the ADA. See supra notes 80-95 and accompanying text.
121. Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin,
Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266 (proposed October 1, 1993) (to have been codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 1609). The proposed guidelines provided in relevant part:
(a) Harassment on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or
disability constitutes discrimination in the terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment and, as such, violates title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. (title VII); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as
amended, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. (ADEA); the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
12101 et seq. (ADA); or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 701 et
seq., as applicable.
(b)(1) Harassment is verbal or physical conduct that denigrates or shows hostility or
aversion toward an individual because of his/her race, color, religion, gender, national
origin, age, or disability, or that of his/her relatives, friends, or associates, and that:
(i) Has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment;
(ii) Has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work
performance; or
(iii) Otherwise adversely affects an individual’s employment opportunities.
. . . (c) The standard for determining whether verbal or physical conduct relating to race,
color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to create a hostile or abusive work environment is whether a reasonable person
in the same or similar circumstances would find the conduct intimidating, hostile, or
abusive. The “reasonable person” standard includes consideration of the perspective of
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rules were heavily influenced by sexual harassment precedent, and
sought to apply this framework to several characteristics including
disability.122 Because these rules were never finalized, we are left with
the guidelines concerning sexual harassment and less frequent case law
and guidelines addressing harassment because of other characteristics.123
Nonetheless, these EEOC Proposed Guidelines demonstrate the fact that
the EEOC interprets harassment to violate the discrimination prohibitions
of both Title VII and the ADA because the protected classes of both
statutes are included within the same Guidelines.124
Second, there are many important parallels between the two statutes.
The primary provisions prohibiting discrimination are virtually
identical.125 The ADA adopts the powers, remedies, and procedures
provisions of Title VII as its enforcement provisions.126 The ADA
incorporates by reference the definitions of “employee” and “employer”
from Title VII.127 In addition, the principle purposes of the two statutes
are very similar.128 The federal regulations promulgated to interpret and
effectuate the ADA also acknowledge the commonality of these two
statutes by saying: “Like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that prohibits
discrimination on the bases of race, color, religion, national origin, and
sex, the ADA seeks to ensure access to equal employment opportunities
based on merit.”129 These factors indicate that the purposes and intent
between the two statutes are so similar that the harassment claim already
recognized under Title VII should be similarly adopted under the ADA.
C. Development & Purposes of Sexual Harassment Claim Under Title
VII
While theoretically there should be a harassment claim under both
statutes, harassment under Title VII must be examined in greater detail in
order to determine whether it is practicable to transfer Title VII
harassment analysis to claims brought under the ADA. As noted above,

persons of the alleged victim’s race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or
disability. It is not necessary to make an additional showing of psychological harm.
Id. at 51,268-69. For additional analysis of the significance of these proposed guidelines, see
Ravitch, supra note 13, at 1500-02.
122. Ravitch, supra note 13 at 1501.
123. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8 (2001) (national origin harassment); supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
124. Ravitch, supra note 13 at 1502.
125. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
129. 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. (2002).
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Title VII harassment claims originated with reference to race and religion
but there is the possibility of harassment claims under Title VII based on
any of the five protected classes.130 Therefore, while it is important to
note that harassment claims can be based on several classes, what
follows is an examination of sexual harassment as an example of
harassment analysis under Title VII.131
In the landmark case of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,132 the
Supreme Court recognized the existence of both quid pro quo and hostile
work environment harassment claims under Section 703(a)(1) of Title
VII.133 The hostile work environment harassment claim is the type that is
potentially applicable to disability harassment claims. Hostile work
environment harassment is present when “unwelcome sexual conduct . . .
‘unreasonably interfer[es] with an individual’s job performance’ or
creates an ‘intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment’ . . .
even if it leads to no tangible or economic job consequences.”134 The
Vinson court explained that in order to constitute a statutory violation,
the harassment must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the
conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working
environment.”135
The EEOC further clarified this holding by outlining factors that are
relevant in an evaluation of whether an environment is “hostile”: whether
the acts were verbal or physical, or both; the frequency of the conduct;
whether the acts were “hostile and patently offensive”; whether the
accused harasser was a co-worker or a supervisor; whether others
participated in the harassing; and whether the acts were directed at more
than one person.136
Another important component of a sexual harassment claim is the
determination of whether the claimed sexual advances were

130. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
131. Sexual harassment was chosen for this part of the analysis because the majority of hostile
work environment harassment cases brought under Title VII involve discrimination based on sex.
Eichhorn, supra note 6, at 580. For the more general discussion of harassment under Title VII, see
supra notes 47-52.
132. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
133. Id. at 65-66. For the text of Section 703(a)(1), see supra note 46. See also supra and infra
notes 49 & 142 and accompanying text for a brief explanation of quid pro quo harassment.
134. SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 33, at C-2 (1996) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3)).
135. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th
Cir. 1982)).
136. SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 33, at C-14 (1996). The Supreme Court commented on
the EEOC’s guidance in this area and described relevant factors in the determination of hostility
slightly differently. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (“[T]he frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”)
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“unwelcome.”137 The Court and the EEOC have recognized that this
inquiry is often difficult to prove because it is heavily tied to questions of
credibility.138 The Court emphasizes that the proper inquiry is about
unwelcomeness rather than about voluntariness of participation in
alleged sexual interaction.139 The EEOC further explains that while each
case is evaluated as to unwelcomeness through a case-by-case
investigation of the totality of the circumstances, the existence of a
contemporaneous complaint is relevant but not determinative.140
This case law precedent resembles the federal regulations concerning
sexual harassment. These regulations generally define harassment that is
in violation of Title VII as, “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature”.141
Such occurrences are considered sexual harassment when one of three
conditions are met: (1) participation in such acts becomes a term or
condition of an employee’s job (quid pro quo); (2) participation or
refusal to participate in such conduct is the reason behind employment
decisions having an impact on the employee (quid pro quo); or (3) this
conduct unreasonably intrudes into the employee’s job performance or
causes a hostile work environment.142 The regulations also specify that
the EEOC should evaluate charges on a case-by-case basis under a
totality of the circumstances.143
The Supreme Court elaborated further on the character of the proper
hostile work environment sexual harassment claim in the 1993 case,
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.144 While first reaffirming the standard
laid out in Vinson, the Court further explained that the standard has both
an objective and a subjective component.145 More specifically, both a
reasonable person and the victim must consider the environment to be
hostile or abusive.146 Finally, there need not be proof of “concrete
psychological harm” in order to establish a violation so long as the
objective and subjective perception requirements are satisfied.147 These
Supreme Court precedents, federal regulations, and additional EEOC
137. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2002) (concerning sexual harassment).
138. See Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 68; SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 33 at C-7 to C13.
139. See Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 68.
140. See SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 33, at C-7 to C-10.
141. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
142. Id.
143. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (2002).
144. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
145. Id. at 21.
146. Id. at 21-22.
147. Id. at 22; Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., Notice 915.002 (Equal
Emp. Opp. Comm’n Mar. 8, 1994), available at SEX DISCRIMINATION supra note 33, at D-1 (1996).
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guidance constitute the body of law that may be adopted, in whole or in
part, for the evaluation of allegations of disability harassment claims
under the ADA.
D. Does the Sexual Harassment Framework of Title VII Fit into the
ADA?
Because of some important differences between Title VII and the
ADA, specifically the differences between disability and the five
characteristics protected under Title VII, the analysis of sexual
harassment claims cannot be wholly adopted for disability harassment
claims.148 Nonetheless, a large portion of the analysis is relevant and
appropriate.
Obviously the core of a hostile work environment claim, due to
discrimination based on sex or disability, is the frequency and
offensiveness of the hostility. Therefore, the EEOC factors149 can be
directly transferred to evaluate whether the conduct was sufficiently
hostile to constitute illegal behavior in the disability context. More
specifically, the factors can be used to evaluate whether the conduct is
verbal or physical and whether the frequency of the conduct would affect
the severity of the alleged hostile work environment.150 Similarly, the
factors can be used to evaluate whether the conduct is offensive and
whether the perpetrator is a co-worker or a superior influences the impact
of it.151 Finally, the number of alleged harassers and alleged victims
alters the harshness of the work environment.152
However, two aspects of the hostile work environment analysis do
not transfer so cleanly from sexual harassment to disability harassment—
the unwelcomeness of the conduct and the dual objective and subjective
components of the evaluation of hostility. First, the Vinson court noted
the necessity of investigating whether participation in the sexual conduct
was voluntary or unwelcome.153 Inherent in this evaluation is the
recognition that in some instances, the sexual conduct is consensual for
some though others might consider it harassing. In contrast, it is hard to
imagine disability harassment as ever being welcome in a comparable
way. Nonetheless, this inconsistency in the contexts of sexual harassment

148. For a discussion of the different visions of equality and discrimination of the ADA and
Title VII due to the differences between the protected classes of each statute, see Eichhorn, supra
note 6, at 590-95.
149. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
150. See SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 33, at C-14 (1996).
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
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and disability harassment does not frustrate the issue of how disability
harassment claims should be analyzed. In fact, it merely demonstrates
that an inquiry into unwelcomeness can either simply be removed from
the analysis or summarily addressed in the evaluation of disability
harassment.
The Harris court clarified sexual harassment analysis further by
emphasizing that evaluation of the hostility of the work environment
should involve both objective and subjective components.154 Such
consideration is appropriately applied to disability harassment claims as
well because an objective component can help encourage some
uniformity in the disposition of these cases and because a subjective
component is necessary to account for the fact that a person with a
disability may react to a work environment differently than the average
reasonable person as envisioned by the courts.155 Evaluation of this
component, however, will be different than in the Title VII context
because of the affirmative requirement of reasonable accommodation.156
Given this affirmative duty, in some instances failure to accommodate –
the lack of action – may contribute to harassment.157 The assessment of
lack of action as potential harassment is wholly inapplicable in the sexual
harassment context.
Finally, it should again be noted that while gender is self-evident,
claims of any kind raised under the ADA must first include evaluation of
whether the claimant is a “qualified individual with a disability” as
defined by the ADA.158 Therefore, any claim for disability harassment
should begin with an investigation of whether the claimant meets the
statutory definition of disability.159 Even if the claimant is adjudicated to
be a qualified person with a disability, some cases may be complicated
by the difficulty of proving that the alleged harasser had knowledge of
the claimant’s disability and that the disability was the reason behind the
harassment.160

154. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
155. That said, the premise that people with disabilities are different from the generic
“reasonable person” reflects a societal marginalization of the people that civil rights statutes are
designed to protect. Eichhorn, supra note 6, at 622. This issue is discussed further in the Resolution
section. See infra notes 190-93, 209-10 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
157. Eichhorn, supra note 6, at 632; Ravitch, supra note 13, at 1512.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2001). For the full text of this ADA provision, see supra note 28
and accompanying text.
159. Ravitch, supra note 13, at 1503.
160. Eichhorn, supra note 6, at 624.

MYERS - MACRO FINAL

288

4/30/2003 5:10 PM

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume XVII

E. How Courts Have Analyzed Disability Harassment Claims So Far
While the courts have not been consistent in discussing the existence
of a disability harassment claim under the ADA,161 they have been
unified in their proposal of how such a claim would be analyzed. The
courts, “[a]ppropriately modifying the parallel Title VII
methodology,”162 specify a multi-part analysis. In order to prove
disability harassment the claimant must show that:
(1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was subjected to
unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on his disability;
(4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter a term,
condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) some factual basis exists
to impute liability for the harassment to the employer.163

Some courts elaborate on this test by recognizing the applicability of
other components of harassment framework from the sexual harassment
context. However, neither Fox nor Flowers, the only two circuit court
cases officially adopting a disability harassment claim,164 discussed
including a subjective and objective component in evaluation.165 Such
consideration can easily be incorporated within the determination of the
“unwelcomeness” of harassment under the second prong of the test.
Other than that omission, the other aspects of the sexual harassment
analysis discussed above are explicitly or implicitly contained within this
disability harassment standard: the determination of disability166 is
explicitly in the first prong; the unwelcomeness167 is explicitly in the
third prong; and the EEOC factors168 can be used to evaluate the severity
and pervasiveness of harassment under the fourth prong. Therefore,
proposals of analysis of disability harassment by courts so far have been
appropriately adjusted to consider the unique aspects of the ADA and
disability compared to Title VII.
Finally, it should be noted that, like other employment discrimination
claims, a disability harassment claim must be specifically alleged in the
claimant’s discrimination charge filed with the EEOC.169 Omission of the

161. See supra Part III.A.
162. Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 177 (4th Cir. 2001).
163. Id.; see also Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of S.E. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 667 (3d Cir.
1999); McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp., 131 F.3d 558, 563 (5th Cir. 1998).
164. See supra notes 77, 80-95 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 137-38, 140 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
169. Kells v. Sinclair Buick—GMC Truck, Inc., 210 F.3d 827, 836-37 (8th Cir. 2000); Dunn
v. WGCI AM/FM Radio, 1998 WL 182516, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 1998).
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claim in the charge indicates failure to exhaust administrative remedies
and dismissal or summary judgment is appropriate.170
IV. RESOLUTION
If and when the courts consistently recognize that a disability
harassment claim is cognizable under the ADA, the courts will face the
challenge of deciding how such claims should be evaluated. Rather than
force Title VII harassment analysis wholesale onto these claims, courts
should consider the merits and weaknesses of suggestions debated in the
sexual harassment context, namely applying a reasonable woman or
reasonable victim standard. By acknowledging the similarities and
differences between the sexual harassment and disability harassment
contexts, the courts can build an appropriate solution upon the
foundation laid by Title VII jurisprudence.
A. Disability Harassment Claims Should Be Cognizable Under the ADA
Surely, the many similarities between the ADA and Title VII
encourage courts to find that a disability harassment claim exists under
the ADA just as courts have already clearly recognized a harassment
claim under Title VII. The purposes of the statutes,171 the statutory
language prohibiting discrimination,172 similar comments in the
legislative history of the statutes,173 and legal commentary on this issue174
all support the recognition of a disability harassment cause of action.
Indeed, while there is confusion among the federal courts about exactly
how to respond to such claims,175 no federal court has expressly denied
this claim.176 Therefore, a disability harassment claim should clearly lie
under the ADA. Hopefully other courts will follow the lead of the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits, which in 2001 explicitly recognized that a disability
harassment claim is cognizable under the ADA.177
After courts acknowledge disability harassment claims, inevitably
the next step is resolving the controversy in defining exactly how such a
claim should be evaluated. While courts that have addressed the issue
have begun the process of adapting Title VII sexual harassment analysis
170. Kells, 210 F.3d at 836-37; Dunn, 1998 WL 182516, at *5.
171. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 16, 22 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Neagle, supra note 13, at 737; Ravitch, supra note 13, at 1496.
175. See supra Part III.A.
176. See Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of S.E. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 666 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999).
177. Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 232 (5th Cir. 2001); Fox v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2001).
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to disability harassment claims under the ADA,178 concerns raised by
legal commentators reveal that the proper analysis of a disability
harassment claim is far from fully resolved.179
B. Potential Alternatives to the Reasonable Person Standard
As noted above, the analysis of a harassment claim has a subjective
and an objective component, namely the reasonable person standard180
that is the main point of controversy.181 Many have indicated the
potential inadequacy of the reasonable person standard. In the context of
sexual harassment cases, the use of a reasonable woman standard and a
reasonable victim standard has been discussed.182 In the specific area of
disability harassment, legal commentators have suggested use of a
reasonable person with the same disability standard.183 Finally, the
EEOC Proposed Guidelines on Harassment184 replace the reasonable
person standard with a “reasonable person in the same or similar
circumstances” test.185 Each standard will be briefly discussed in turn.

178. See supra Part III.E.
179. See, e.g., Ravitch, supra note 13, at 1503-13.
180. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
181. One commentator also has noted that the “severe or pervasive conduct” standard sets a
high bar that will make the hostile work environment claim inaccessible to many. Melinda Slusser,
Note: Flowers v. Southern Regional Physician Services: A Step in the Right Direction, 33 U. TOL. L.
REV. 713, 740 (2002). This criticism, however, does not justify a modification of disability
harassment analysis until Title VII standards are modified or statutory language or history can be
identified to merit lowering this bar.
182. Jolynn Childers, Note: Is There a Place for a Reasonable Woman in the Law? A
Discussion of Recent Developments in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 42 DUKE L.J. 854,
880, 883, 902-04 (1993). Beyond the sexual harassment context, non-neutral standards have been
utilized under other classes protected by Title VII. See, e.g., Duplessis v. Training & Dev. Corp., 835
F. Supp. 671, 677 (D. Me. 1993) (using “reasonable Franco-American” standard for hostile work
environment national origin harassment claim); Harris v. Int’l Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1516
(D. Me. 1991) (applying “reasonable black person” standard for hostile environment racial
harassment claim).
183. See, e.g., Neagle, supra note 13, at 737; Ravitch, supra note 13, at 1503-05. Lisa
Eichhorn criticizes this suggestion because the fact finder inevitably has difficulty fully
understanding and applying the perspective of a person with a particular disability that the fact finder
does not have. Instead, she proposes that disability harassment claims apply an objective evaluation
of the hostility of the work environment “given the circumstance of the plaintiff’s disability.”
Eichhorn, supra note 6, at 622. Because Eichhorn’s distinction seems to be one more of semantics
than of substance, it is not addressed in a separate section, although her initial criticism is an
important one.
184. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
185. Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin,
Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266,51,269 (proposed October 1, 1993).

MYERS - MACRO FINAL

265]

4/30/2003 5:10 PM

DISABILITY HARASSMENT

291

1. The reasonable woman standard in sexual harassment cases
In the sexual harassment context, there has been discussion of
whether analysis of claims should utilize a “reasonable woman” rather
than a “reasonable person” standard.186 The Ninth Circuit applied the
reasonable woman standard in Ellison v. Brady, reasoning that
“[c]onduct that many men [would] consider unobjectionable may offend
many women.”187 This is because the reasonable person standard can be
applied with a male perspective to reinforce the status quo.188
Some commentators argue that the reasonable woman standard is an
imperfect solution because this standard ignores the fact that in a small
number of cases, the victims of sexual harassment are men.189 Putting
aside this demographic factor, critics have also identified three
difficulties created by the reasonable woman standard: the problem in
defining the reasonable woman; the “marginalization” that is caused by
using a standard premised on difference; and, practically, the old biases
that may be tied to such a standard.190
First, the reasonable woman standard presumes that women as a
group have a definable, unvaried perspective tied to their status as
women.191 Further, establishment of a distinct legal category for women
may perpetuate perception of difference between genders that itself may
encourage the problem of harassment.192 Finally, courts may apply this
standard through envisioning a woman that is more like a man so that the
male perspective is still predominant.193
2. The reasonable victim standard in sexual harassment cases
In recognizing these problems with the reasonable woman standard,
some legal authors instead suggest the use of a “reasonable victim”
standard because the use of a gender-neutral term narrows the potential
for bias, marginalization, and reinforcement of traditional gender roles.194

186. See, e.g., Childers, supra note 182.
187. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).
188. Childers, supra note 182, at 877.
189. Id. at 891-92.
190. Id. at 888.
191. Id. at 893; Eichhorn, supra note 6, at 620.
192. Childers, supra note 182, at 895.
193. Id. at 900. This statement may seem ridiculous at first glance. It is based, however, on
comparison of cases with similar facts, one using the reasonable person standard and the other using
the reasonable woman standard, that have the same results. Id. at 901. This evaluation reveals the
stubbornness of gender bias, perhaps given resentment to singling out one gender as meriting unique
analysis that is reflected in the reasonable woman standard.
194. See, e.g., id. at 901-02. But see Leslie M. Kerns, A Feminist Perspective: Why Feminists
Should Give the Reasonable Woman Standard Another Chance, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 195,
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Instead, this term emphasizes the power relationship between the parties
that may be linked to employment positions, not just gender
difference.195 This refocusing stops a legal analysis from reinforcing the
gender-biased thinking that may support incidents of sexual harassment
in the first place.
This discussion about the appropriate analysis for sexual harassment
is similarly applicable in the disability harassment context. Just as, given
traditional gender roles, there may be resentment of female presence in
the workplace, employers may resist the presence or the affirmative
requirement of reasonable accommodation of people with disabilities. In
addition, employers may make unfair and inaccurate assumptions about
the capabilities of disabled as well as female employees. Finally, people
with disabilities, like women, come to the workplace with a perspective
and sensibility that merits acknowledgment even though it is different
from the mainstream male perspective.
3. The reasonable person with the same disability standard
Legal commentator Frank Ravitch proposed a modification to Title
VII sexual harassment analysis when applied to disability harassment
cases under the ADA in order to address the distinctions between the two
statutes and contexts.196 His suggested analysis of disability harassment
claims would ask:
(1) whether the alleged victim is a qualified individual with a disability,
and (2) whether the individual was, or is, subject to intimidating,
hostile, or abusive conduct based on a known disability, which that
individual perceived, and a reasonable person with the same disability
would consider, sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, thereby creating a hostile or
abusive work environment.197

Ravitch suggested the reasonable person with the same disability
standard because the reasonable person standard ignores a fundamental
provision of the ADA – the affirmative requirement of reasonable
accommodation198 – that inherently examines the individual needs of
each employee.199

196-97 (2001) (arguing that the reasonable woman standard is preferable in sexual harassment cases
precisely because its gender specificity focuses attention on gender roles and gender bias that
encourage sexual harassment).
195. Childers, supra note 182, at 902.
196. Ravitch, supra note 13, at 1503-05.
197. Id. at 1504-05.
198. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
199. Ravitch, supra note 13, at 1508.
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Just as the reasonable woman standard seeks to highlight the unique
sensibilities of women, Ravitch’s standard of a reasonable person with
the same disability focuses attention on the unique perspective of people
with disabilities. Therefore, Ravitch’s proposal can be evaluated with
respect to the criticisms raised above about the reasonable woman
standard.200 First, Ravitch’s standard partially relieves the definitional
criticism levied against the reasonable woman standard: it considers the
diversity within the group of people with disabilities by specifying the
same disability, thus at least narrowing interpretation to be more in line
with an individual plaintiff. Courts would still face the difficulty of
discerning what, for example, a reasonable blind person versus a
reasonable paraplegic may feel.201
Second, like the reasonable woman standard, however, it also by its
very name emphasizes the making of a distinction between people with
disabilities and people without disabilities under the law. Given the
negative perception of the ADA as an unfair windfall to plaintiffs with
disabilities,202 such a distinction may invoke negative connotations. As
such, Ravitch’s standard may further marginalize people with
disabilities, which may then encourage perceptions that facilitate
harassment.
Third, by explicitly identifying a distinct legal category for people
with disabilities, ingrained biases may be triggered. However, this
criticism does not have as much force as it does in the gender context
because the ADA, as a civil rights statute, addresses only people with
disabilities so that as a class they have already been singularly
distinguished under the law. While the ADA is very similar to
protections for the five classes of persons covered by Title VII, there are
differences, including the affirmative requirement of reasonable
accommodation and the evaluation of whether a plaintiff is a qualified
person with a disability.203 Therefore, in sum, all three criticisms of the
reasonable woman standard are also applicable to the reasonable person
with the same disability standard, in varying degrees. Nonetheless,
Ravitch’s standard is a useful step towards recognizing the importance of
considering the unique sensibilities of the plaintiffs in disability
harassment cases.

200.
201.
202.
203.

See supra Part IV.B.1.
See Eichhorn, supra note 6, at 621-22.
See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 20-35 and accompanying text.
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4. The reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances standard
The EEOC Proposed Guidelines204 provide a different way to slightly
modify the reasonable person standard through the suggestion of the
reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances standard.205 The
Guidelines explicitly explain that evaluation with this standard “includes
consideration of the perspective of persons of the alleged victim’s race,
color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability.”206
This standard is very similar to language recently used by the U.S.
Supreme Court in evaluating a same-sex harassment case: “Common
sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts
and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among
members of the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in the
plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive.”207
Thus, both the EEOC and the U.S. Supreme Court have used
language modifying “reasonable person” to encourage the consideration
of the specific circumstances of an individual plaintiff using neutral
terms much like the proposed reasonable victim standard. However,
these two formulations lack the emotional punch of the term “reasonable
victim.” The reasonable victim standard, unlike these proposals,
emphasizes the power differential and the alleged harassment that is
central to the claim.208
C. A Proposal: The Reasonable Victim Standard in Disability
Harassment Cases
Given that many of the same criticisms of the reasonable woman
standard are present for the reasonable person with the same disabilities
standard, the reasonable victim standard proposal should be considered
in the disability harassment context as well. The use of a disabilityneutral term diverts focus from the potential for marginalization or
bias.209 As a result, this legal test emphasizes the alleged harassment –
the victimization – rather than a characteristic of the employee that itself

204. See supra notes 121-24.
205. Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin,
Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266 at 51,269 (to be codified 29 C.F.R. § 300).
206. Id.
207. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (emphasis added). In
addition, this passage encourages “appropriate sensitivity to social context,” which seems to indicate
that some consideration of the plaintiff’s subjective perspective is appropriate. Id. Michael J. Frank,
The Social Context Variable in Hostile Environment Litigation, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 437, 437
(2002).
208. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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may have stimulated the biases that encouraged the alleged
harassment.210 This neutrality can also facilitate harmonization in the
standards applied to all protected classes under the ADA and Title VII.
The reasonable victim standard focuses on the power disparity in the
employment relationship on an individualized basis more effectively than
the reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances standard.
Disability, like gender, is not something to be ashamed of. The
purpose of the reasonable victim standard is not to obscure these
qualities, but to centralize the analysis on the interaction between the
parties. In applying this standard, courts will consider many factors
affecting the individual perspective of a victim, including his or her
disability. Therefore, the claimant’s disability still constitutes one factor
in evaluating the severity and pervasiveness of the hostile work
environment.
In addition, the reasonable victim standard, if adopted in the
disability harassment context, is potentially also applicable to other
protected classes, including gender. There would be more harmonization
and clarity of analysis, specifically of disability harassment claims, if the
same analysis is used in the context of other types of harassment. The
U.S. Supreme Court has encouraged facilitating uniformity among
analysis of harassment based on different characteristics.211 This
uniformity is appropriate given the large overlap in statutory language,
interpretation, and application of Title VII and the ADA discussed
throughout this article.
V. CONCLUSION
The ADA has been the subject of media portrayal as a windfall
statute for plaintiffs, some of whom may have questionable disabilities,
which encourages frivolous litigation.212 In addition to denouncing the
high volume of lawsuits, critics also have attacked the cost of reasonable
accommodation.213 Unfortunately, these portrayals of the ADA
demonstrate a bias against the statute that may discourage courts from
expanding its enforcement, for example, through expressly recognizing
another cause of action such as disability harassment. Instead of focusing
on the cost of accommodation, naysayers should consider the estimated
$200 to $300 billion cost to the U.S. economy in support payments and
210. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
211. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 n.1 (1998).
212. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 99 (1999).
213. WALTER OLSON, THE EXCUSE FACTORY: HOW EMPLOYMENT LAW IS PARALYZING THE
AMERICAN WORKPLACE 102-03 (1997).
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lost productivity because the skills of people with disabilities are
underutilized in the workforce,214 likely in part to virtually unchecked
instances of workplace hostility.
In order to buttress the contention that a disability harassment claim
should be cognizable under the ADA, it should be noted that statistics
reveal that the ADA has so far provided little relief for plaintiffs.
Defendants win more than 93% of reported ADA employment
discrimination cases decided on the merits in trial courts; defendants also
win in 84% of cases that are appealed.215 These statistics reveal less
success by plaintiffs than in comparative areas of the law, with only
prisoner rights cases having a similarly low rate of success.216 Therefore,
courts should not be hesitant because of misguided public opinion to
implement the ADA to its full extent.
The many and important similarities between Title VII and the ADA
clearly indicate the need for and the appropriateness of finding that a
disability harassment claim is cognizable under the ADA in that such
claims are similar to harassment claims already recognized under Title
VII. While most courts have hesitated to endorse this disability
harassment claim, the difficult aspect of this issue remains determining
exactly how such a claim should be analyzed. Given a few key
differences between Title VII and the ADA, most notably the affirmative
requirement of reasonable accommodation, harassment analysis under
Title VII cannot be wholly transferred to the ADA context. Incorporating
the reasonable victim standard into this analysis helps address these
inconsistencies.

214. Ben Cristal, Going Beyond the Judicially Prescribed Boundaries of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 493, 495 (1996). Put another way, a 1998 survey revealed
that 26.6% of people with disabilities were employed, while 78.4% of the non-disabled were
employed. Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, Economics of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, Part III: Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 271, 272
(2000).
215. Colker, supra note 212, at 100.
216. Id. The comparable cases examined were also employment discrimination cases. Id. at
100 n.10.

